

Implementation of Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Riau-Malaysia Maritime Border Area

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Abstract - This study aims to analyze the implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border area. Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic country, possessing a vast maritime territory, with a coastline of over 81,000 kilometers. Indonesia's strategic position as a maritime nation located between two continents and two oceans makes it a crucial player in global trade and geopolitical traffic. However, this enormous potential also presents various challenges, particularly in maintaining the sovereignty and security of maritime border areas, including the Ambalat region, which borders directly with Malaysia. This study focuses on a case study of the implementation of maritime security policies in the border area. Using a qualitative approach using a case study method, data were obtained from observations, documentation, and interviews. The results show that the implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border area faces complex challenges from structural, functional, and cultural perspectives. Although Indonesia's claim to the Ambalat Block is supported by a strong legal basis, namely the 1969 Continental Shelf Treaty and the 1982 UNCLOS, its implementation in practice remains suboptimal. The main obstacles include policy objectives that are not yet operationally measurable, limited resources, sectoral egos between agencies without a unified command, and weak coordination and communication between agencies that are not yet integrated in a responsive and real-time manner.

Keywords - Policy Implementation, Maritime Security, Ambalat Maritime Border Area.

I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic country, boasting a vast maritime territory, with a coastline of over 81,000 kilometers. Indonesia's strategic position as a maritime nation situated between two continents and two oceans makes it a crucial player in global trade and geopolitical affairs. However, this enormous potential also presents various challenges, particularly in maintaining the sovereignty and security of maritime border areas, including the Ambalat region, which borders Malaysia. The Indonesia-Malaysia maritime border in Ambalat is a strategic region with significant economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic potential. This region is not only rich in natural resources, such as oil and gas, but also serves as a vital international trade route. However, border disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia in this region frequently create tensions that have the potential to disrupt regional security stability.

In an effort to maintain maritime sovereignty and security, Indonesia has implemented various maritime security policies, one of which is through maritime security operations involving various agencies, such as the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency), and other related institutions. These policies aim to ensure law enforcement at sea, prevent illegal activities such as illegal fishing, smuggling, and territorial violations, and maintain diplomatic relations with neighboring countries. Despite the various policies being implemented, the implementation of maritime security policies in the Indonesia-Malaysia maritime border area, particularly in Ambalat, still faces various challenges. Some of these include limited human resources and technology, suboptimal inter-agency coordination, and complex geopolitical dynamics.

Furthermore, the successful implementation of these policies also depends on Indonesia's ability to build international cooperation, particularly with Malaysia, to resolve border disputes peacefully and constructively. The Ambalat Block actually belongs to Indonesia, this is based on evidence that the Indonesia-Malaysia Continental Boundary Agreement was signed on October 27, 1969, which was signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

and then ratified on November 7, 1969. 5 The ownership of Ambalat by Indonesia is very strong evidence, because both country representatives were present and signed each other. The location of the signing of the Indonesia-Malaysia Continental Boundary Agreement was also carried out in Kuala Lumpur, meaning that Malaysia was the host and witness at the time of the agreement. Thus, Malaysia cannot make claims to ownership of Ambalat, because both countries have agreed in the October 27, 1969 agreement that Ambalat is Indonesian territory. However, in reality, Malaysia's claims to ownership of Ambalat continue to be made, thus giving rise to ongoing disputes with Indonesia.

In International Law, the Ambalat Block dispute must be resolved peacefully, namely through negotiation or diplomacy. UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) has agreed that Ambalat is part of Indonesian territory, so Indonesia can refer to UNCLOS regarding the Ambalat conflict. Meanwhile, Malaysia still adheres to its claim to Ambalat based on the 1979 Malaysian map. Indonesia and Malaysia are members of UNCLOS, Indonesia signed UNCLOS in 1985 in Law No. 17 1985 while Malaysia ratified it on October 14, 1996.6 If both countries are members of UNCLOS, it means that Indonesia and Malaysia must follow all regulations issued by UNCLOS. One such location is the Ambalat region in the northern waters of Kalimantan, bordering Malaysia directly, which is a strategic area in the area of the maritime border of the country and its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The overlapping of the territorial claims is a cause of bilateral tensions in this region especially given that it has a high potential in natural resources and greatest access to international shipping routes. Within the framework of the international law, the Republic of Indonesia acceded to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with the help of Law Number 17 of 1985, and is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including the waters of Ambalat. Nationally, the management and security of this region are regulated through various policies such as Law Number 5 of 1983 concerning the EEZ, Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and Law Number 32 of 2014 concerning Maritime Affairs, which strengthens the role of the Indonesian Navy and Bakamla as the vanguard of national maritime security.

However, the implementation of maritime security policies in border areas such as Ambalat still faces various challenges, including limited monitoring facilities and infrastructure, suboptimal inter-agency coordination, and constantly evolving geopolitical dynamics. However, maritime security policies should be successfully implemented so that the sovereignty of the territory could be preserved and possible military conflicts on the sea could be avoided. Thus, there is a strong need to conduct a profound research on the policy of maritime security implementation in the Ambalat region, the actors, as well as the inhibiting and facilitating factors which affect the success. This research is crucial for providing strategic input for policymakers and implementing officials in the field in securing Indonesia's maritime border areas comprehensively and sustainably. In the sense that Malaysia should not have the right to make a claim to Ambalat, because according to UNCLOS Ambalat is included in Indonesian territory. Ambalat is an area that has been targeted by Malaysia since 1979.

Tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia continued in 2005 when 17 Indonesian citizens were arrested by Malaysian warships in the Ambalat block area. Entering 2007, several Malaysian warships and patrol aircraft entered the Ambalat Block, resulting in the Indonesian Navy using 4 warships, namely KRI Untung Suropati, KRI Ki Hadjar Dewantara, KRI Welang, and KRI Keris to block ships from Malaysia. 8 Malaysia continues to carry out provocations to provoke Indonesia into conflict, even though from the beginning in 2005 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono met with the Commander of the Royal Malaysian Army, Mohammad Zahidin, at the Merdeka Palace to discuss the Ambalat Block conflict so that it can be resolved diplomatically. Although diplomacy has been agreed upon by both countries to resolve the Ambalat dispute, the result is that the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia regarding Ambalat has not been resolved.

The Ambalat Block dispute is interesting to discuss because both countries, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, have evidence of what they are fighting over. Indonesia adheres to the UNCLOS rules which state that Ambalat belongs to Indonesia while Malaysia has the 1979 Malaysia Map which contains the boundary line of Ambalat into Malaysian territory. Malaysia always tries to find Indonesia's negligence in order to seize Ambalat.

Meanwhile, Indonesia tries to conduct diplomacy so that Malaysia's claim is stopped, so as not to cause a conflict that is feared could lead to war. All efforts made by Indonesia in this conflict are more directed towards creating peace, so that Indonesia can defend Ambalat or get Ambalat back and Indonesia Malaysia can be at peace again. In 2016, the efforts made by Indonesia have been able to produce results, as evidenced by PT Pertamina represented by the Director of Exploration of PT PHE Rudy Ryacudu together with the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) Sudirman Said in the 40th IPA Convention and Exhibition to carry out an oil and gas management contract in the Ambalat Block and in 2017 PT Pertamina has carried out oil and gas management in Ambalat. PT Pertamina's control over oil and gas management in Ambalat is a form of Indonesia's sovereignty over the Ambalat Block, meaning that in 2017 the Ambalat Block was successfully defended by Indonesia through peace efforts.

Enhancing the security and sovereignty of a nation's territorial waters is based on the maritime boundaries surrounding its land area. This explains why maritime security is a crucial issue for any nation. Various forms of maritime threats that disrupt maritime security stability are very diverse, including: illegal fishing, transshipment, drug smuggling, human trafficking, piracy, and terrorism. Cases that have occurred in recent years include cases of illegal fishing by foreign fishing vessels that are still frequent, according to the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti "our country has suffered a lot of losses from the practice of Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported (IUU) Fishing" the value of the losses is estimated to reach 300 trillion per year" (KKP, 2015).

PRC fishing vessels were caught by Indonesian authorities in this region, and the Indonesian authorities burned and blew up PRC fishing vessels and also other countries to be used as fish aggregating devices (FADs) so that fish remain in the area. Even later, PRC fishing vessels began to be escorted by PRC Coast Guard vessels (Ramli, 2017). Crimes in maritime border areas are mostly committed by foreign fishermen who enter under the escort and supervision of their country's Coast Guard in Indonesian maritime border waters. Regarding this incident, the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti is trying hard to reduce the number of illegal fishing, even though she knows her members have failed to arrest the perpetrators of illegal fishing vessels. fishing vessel KM Kway Fey 100078.

Susi even asked the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to file a diplomatic protest (Adiastuti, 2018). The recklessness of foreign fishermen often stems from the presence of escorts at sea by their country's law enforcement. This falls under the umbrella of foreign policy and defense-security issues. A country whose territory is threatened by threats to its sovereignty over its maritime territory directly impacts various aspects of life, including political, economic, socio-cultural, and defense-security aspects. This security aspect is a national concern in the context of maritime security.

Indonesia's territorial conditions are crucial for its geography and geopolitics. Regarding geographical issues, border issues between countries in the Asia-Pacific region still pose a potential for unresolved border disputes. Empirical evidence suggests that one of the main causes of traditional and non-traditional crimes is related to territorial boundaries. The ongoing security and crisis in this context can increase the occurrence of traditional threats if dispute management is not carried out appropriately.

The purpose of this study is to examine the maritime security management that has been implemented and to examine the impact of maritime security management on the defense and security aspects in the Ambalat region. This theory will help in connecting security management issues with maritime power, the relationship of stakeholders in maritime security to maritime-minded countries. In the book *Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific* (Agistia & Perwita, 2016) the concept of AT Mahan's theory reveals the condition of a country's territory that has great potential for its maritime power, exploitation of its continental countries.

Therefore, this study aims to analyze the implementation of maritime security policies in the RI-Malaysia maritime border area in Ambalat, with a focus on maritime security operations carried out by various related agencies. This study will also evaluate the effectiveness of the policies that have been implemented, identify the challenges faced, and provide strategic recommendations to improve the security and sovereignty of Indonesia's maritime territory in the future.

II. METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach with a case study. This qualitative approach was chosen because it allows researchers to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of maritime security policy implementation occurring in a natural context. According to Creswell (2014), qualitative research aims to understand the meanings generated by individuals or groups regarding social or humanitarian issues. Case studies are used to explore phenomena, programs, or processes in detail within certain boundaries (bounded systems). This research focuses on the implementation of maritime security policies in the Indonesia-Malaysia maritime border area in Ambalat, making a case study the most appropriate approach.

The research was conducted in the maritime border area of Indonesia–Malaysia in Ambalat, with a focus on the implementation of maritime security policies based on six variables of the Van Meter & Van Horn model: (1) policy objectives, (2) resources, (3) organizational characteristics, (4) inter- agency communication, (5) implementer attitudes, and (6) environmental conditions. Data sources consist of primary data: in-depth interviews and field observations. Secondary data: policy documents, operational reports, and institutional archives. Informants were selected purposively, including operational implementers (TNI AL, Bakamla), structural officials, maritime policy experts, community leaders or local fishermen. Data collection techniques used: in-depth interviews (semi-structured), observation and documentation. Data analysis follows the interactive model in qualitative analysis from Miles, Huberman & Saldaña (2014) including: Data Collection, Data Condensation, Data Presentation, Conclusion Drawing and Verification.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. General Description of Research Location

The Ambalat waters, which are part of Sebatik District, Nunukan Regency, North Kalimantan Province, are a maritime boundary disputed between Indonesia and Malaysia. The name Ambalat originally refers to a village located approximately 49.6 km west of Tarakan, North Kalimantan. Indonesia then adopted this name to designate an offshore oil and gas exploration concession block. Ambalat is a vast sea block covering 15,235 km² located in the Sulawesi Sea or Makassar Strait and is located near the extension of the land border between Sabah, Malaysia, and North Kalimantan, Indonesia. Most or all of the Ambalat Block is located more than 12 miles from the baseline, thus falling under the sovereign rights regime, not sovereignty.



Figure 1. Ambalat Maritime Territory

The Ambalat Block is located in the Kayan River estuary, forming a delta offshore at depths ranging from 1,000 to 2,375 meters below sea level on the Kalimantan continental shelf. The area to this depth is a continuation of the Indonesian Kalimantan mainland, which is a sedimentary basin for the deposition of terrigenous sediments (of land origin). The Ambalat Block is within the Tarakan Basin in North Kalimantan, which has the potential to produce oil and natural gas, and has been in production. The Ambalat Block is a natural continuation of the

Indonesian Kalimantan mainland, its bedrock is part of the continental plate that formed Kalimantan. The sedimentary rocks above it originate from the Kalimantan mainland, which are then transported via the Kayan River to be deposited to form large deHas on the continental shelf in question.

One of the main legal bases used by Indonesia in claiming the Ambalat region is the Continental Shelf Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia which was signed on October 27, 1969 and ratified by Indonesia on November 7, 1969. This agreement is a bilateral agreement that specifically delimits the continental shelf areas of the two countries in the Sulawesi Sea area. In the agreement, it has been stipulated that the continental shelf boundary line is drawn based on the principle of equidistance from the coastal points of the two countries, taking into account the configuration of the coastline and regional geographic characteristics.

Based on the boundary line agreed in the agreement, the Ambalat Block area is firmly and explicitly included in the Indonesian continental shelf. But Malaysia later gave out a New Map in 1979 which unilaterally claimed their national maritime boundaries, and in the new map, Malaysia extended the jurisdiction of the Ambalat Block. This one-sided assertion immediately attracted vehement protest of Indonesia, as it contravened the content of the 1969 Agreement to which both of them had concurred in its ratification, and contravened the provisions of the international maritime law. Other countries that were neighbors like Philippines and Vietnam also rejected the map since it was not founded on negotiations but based entirely on the unilateral political claims of Malaysia. Since then, the dispute over the status of the Ambalat Block has continued to be a sensitive bilateral issue between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Along with the development of international law, especially in the field of maritime law, Indonesia is increasingly strengthening its position by referring to the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, which has been ratified by Indonesia through Law Number 17 of 1985. This ratification indicates that Indonesia is subject to and committed to the international norms stipulated in UNCLOS. In the convention, especially Article 76 and Article 77, it is explained that coastal states have the right to determine the continental shelf area up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline, or further if there is a geological foundation that can be scientifically proven to be a natural continuation of the national land.

a. Dimensions and Objectives in the Implementation of Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Maritime Border Area

Dimensions and objectives are among the most fundamental components in determining the success of public policy implementation. In the context of maritime security policy in the Ambalat maritime border region, clarity of dimensions and objectives is crucial because this region concerns aspects of sovereignty, international law, and national strategic interests. As emphasized by Meter and Van Horn (1975), a policy that does not have specific, measurable, and realistic objectives will be difficult to implement effectively in the field.

Maritime security policy in the Ambalat region essentially aims to safeguard state sovereignty, enforce law at sea, and protect national interests in maritime border regions. This normative objective is reflected in various laws and regulations including Law Number 34 of 2004 regarding the Indonesian National Armed Forces, in which in Article 7 paragraph (2) the main responsibility of TNI, especially of the Navy is to enforce the law and to provide security within the national maritime jurisdiction. In addition, Law Number 43 of 2008 concerning State Territory also clarifies the importance of managing state borders as part of national sovereignty and integrity.

The other equally relevant goal is to achieve the security of potential economic operations like exploration and exploitation of natural resources especially oil and gas in the Ambalat Block. This is a region that is believed to contain great potential oil and gas that has been disputed over since 1979 between Indonesia and Malaysia, with overlapping claims. Hence, Maritime security in this area is defensive as well as proactive, to help enable national economic development to be sustainable. According to the findings of the interview with the sources, it is possible to conclude that the purposes of the maritime security policy on the territory of the Ambalat region are fundamentally intended to secure the national sovereignty of the country, maritime natural resources, and to

prevent territorial invasions by the foreign parties. However, in practice, these objectives have not been formulated specifically and measurably at the operational implementation level.

The measure of success of the implementation of this policy can be seen through a number of indicators, including: 1) Reducing the number of border violations by foreign vessels; 2) Effectiveness of patrols and maritime security operations by the Indonesian Navy and Bakamla; 3) Cross-sector coordination between agencies such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs; 4) Rapid response to border incidents, both through diplomacy and tactical actions in the field; 5) Expansion of maritime radar surveillance and sensing technology around the Ambalat area.

Furthermore, there is no standardized measure of policy implementation success in the Ambalat maritime border region that can be used as a reference for implementation and performance evaluation. The determination of success indicators remains informal and relies heavily on the interpretation and initiative of each implementing unit in the field. This has the potential to lead to inconsistencies, overlapping authority, and difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of policy implementation nationally. The resource person also emphasized that the lack of clarity in policy metrics and objectives directly impacts the effectiveness of inter-institutional coordination (such as the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries) and hinders consistency in securing areas of high geopolitical and geoeconomic value such as the Ambalat Block.

b. Resources in the Implementation of Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Maritime Border Area

For an archipelagic nation, having a strong and well-coordinated maritime force is essential. This is because archipelagic nations possess a wide range of advantages. As stipulated in UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), maritime law grants rights to archipelagic areas regulated within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where each stretch extending up to 200 miles allows a country to manage its marine resources. This can be a contributing factor to inter-state conflict, as abundant marine resources and close geographical proximity can trigger various conflicts, such as theft of marine resources and border disputes.

With a maritime force strengthened by the deployment of a strong, qualified navy, equipped with modern military defense technology, a country's security will be greatly beneficial in empowering marine resources, developing and building maritime forces, and enforcing law and security in maritime areas in accordance with national and international law. The navy also has a significant role of ensuring that its territory is secure particularly in securing the outermost islands which are prone to conflict among states. As the key weapons systems, including the use of fast boats and sufficient military weaponry become available, it will be one of the main contributors to the prevention of maritime crimes and threats as soon as possible and with high precision. The introduction of a navy will influence the maritime security of a country, including the preservation of the marine resources, the prevention of illegal immigrants smuggling, and the national sovereignty under the threat of violating the boundaries. Each maritime nation naturally has a different deployment of naval forces according to its own needs and interests.

Based on interviews with key informants, it can be concluded that resources are a key factor determining the effectiveness of maritime security policy implementation in the Ambalat maritime border region. However, reality suggests that the existing amounts of resources fall short of the necessary ones, not only in human resources, logistics, and financial resources to conduct operations but also the technology to monitor the situation. The small workforce has led to low levels of maritime patrol and the poor ability to detect threats or illegal activities in the border waters at an earlier stage. In the meantime, logistical and funding assignments have failed to keep up with most of the operations, which has made most security operations to be reactive and not proactive. Moreover, the absence of cross-sectoral synergy among the agencies (Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, Polairud, and the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP)) contributes to the difficulties associated with the effective and integrated use of resources. The result of this lack of coordination is a possibility of overlapping or unfinished action on the ground. In general, these results suggest that the realization of maritime security policies in the Ambalat region involves not only the need to organize a regulatory framework clearly but also the

adequate, long-term, and jointly managed resource provision. Therefore, stronger policy affirmation from the central government is needed to strengthen resource capacity in this strategic border region, both in the form of human resource support, logistics, and the development of technology-based surveillance systems.

c. Characteristics of the Implementing Organization in the Implementation of Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Maritime Border Area

The successful implementation of maritime security policies, particularly in maritime border areas like Ambalat, is largely determined by the characteristics of the implementing organization. In the view of the public policy implementation theory, which was postulated by Meter and Van Horn (1975), implementing organizations are at the center of converting the policy goals into tangible programs and activities at the ground level. These organizational characteristics include bureaucratic structure, coordination patterns, technical capabilities, and inherent organizational culture.

In the Ambalat border area, there are several main implementing organizations involved in maintaining maritime security, namely:

- 1) The Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) through its sea patrol unit and the nearest base (Lantamal XIII/Tarakan), is responsible for military operations in maintaining national sovereignty.
- 2) The Maritime Security Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (Bakamla RI) acts as a non-ministerial institution that conducts integrated security and safety patrols in Indonesian jurisdictional waters.
- 3) The Water and Air Police (Polairud) plays a role in maritime law enforcement, especially crimes such as smuggling, illegal fishing, and cross-border violations.
- 4) The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) and the Directorate General of Customs and Excise also supervise the maritime economic sector and the movement of goods.

The management of border areas such as Ambalat is a symbol of national sovereignty. The introduction of the organizations like the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla (Law and Security Agency), Polairud (Water Police) and the ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) are introduced and implemented within the context of the Indonesian-Malaysia bilateral relationship where the national policy significantly affect the functioning of these organizations. But in reality, sectoral egos are still exhibited by the nature of the implementers on the ground, and this subsides out of optimum inter-agency political synergy. The nature of policy orientation, command structure, and institutional interests of individual agencies usually impedes cross-agency coordination. The absence of a unified command or dominant lead agency leads to overlapping policy implementation and an unresponsiveness to escalating maritime threats.

Based on the results of the interviews above with several sources, the characteristics of the implementing organizations in the implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border area still face various complex challenges, both from a structural, functional, and cultural perspective. These three elements play a critical role towards the success of the policy implementation in places that experience high strategic vulnerability like Ambalat. Structurally, it was established that the institutional overlaps exist between some of the agencies charged with the responsibility of ensuring maritime security. The application of the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, Polairud, and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) all have their respective legal mandate and an operating procedure. However, the lack of one particular body that would be understood as the lead one or the principal implementer in the execution of maritime security policies at the border introduces inefficiency in the coordination and usually results in a lack of clarity in decisions as in the case of an emergency situation in the field. The horizontal structure between agencies has resulted in the failure to realize integrated command and operations in the Ambalat maritime border area.

Furthermore, in terms of organizational resources, including human resources (HR), logistics, and funding, significant limitations remain. The resource individual clarified that the amount of staff deployed to the Ambalat region is not ideal, whereas the area that is under surveillance is huge and has a lot of geographical difficulties. In addition, the amount and willingness of patrol vessels and main weapons systems (alutsista) remain insufficient to support the continued operations. This is also enhanced by poor budget allocation and lack of logistical

support to carry routine maritime patrols. In the context of maritime security, resource availability is a key pillar for the sustainability and consistency of policy implementation in the field.

The organization culture view shows that the nature of implementing organizations in Ambalat region is still stuck in tough sectoral and bureaucratic work patterns. Individual agencies have a habit of keeping exclusive nature thereby restricting coordination and cooperation. Information and communication system interoperability does not exist, resulting in time delays in exchanging intelligence data and incident reports among agencies. This has a direct influence on the delays in the reaction to the possible law breaches in the maritime borders region by foreign fishermen, unlawful practices, or threats to the national sovereignty. A cross-sectoral collaborative culture has not yet become the operational norm, necessitating organizational cultural reform that prioritizes synergy and national interests over sectoral interests.

Nevertheless, there are indications that efforts toward improvement have begun. Some forms of cross-sector synergy have begun to develop, although they are still limited and not yet fully institutionalized. As such, enhancing the nature of the implementing organization should be achieved in terms of structural and regulatory means. This involves developing the single command or permanent body of coordination with full legal powers to control, monitor and implement the maritime security policies in the border region. This order should be cross-sectoral in nature and with effective regulations and an open system of oversight. The effectiveness of the implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border area is determined by how much the implementing body can change itself to a resilient, adaptive, and responsive entity. Such transformation should encompass the change of the organizational structure, the quality of human resources and logistics, the creation of the inclusive working culture founded on the strategic cooperation. If the characteristics of the implementing organization can be directed toward a more synergistic and professional direction, the policy objective of maintaining the sovereignty and security of Indonesia's border region in Ambalat will be more easily achieved.

d. Inter-Organizational Communication in the Implementation of Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Maritime Border Area

In public policy systems, communication between organizations plays a fundamental role in determining the success of implementation. This can be seen even more in the policies regarding maritime security especially the maritime border such as in Ambalat. The Ambalat is a strategic and sensitive area, and it is situated right in the Sulawesi Sea with Malaysia as a direct neighbor. This does not just happen to be the case because of its abundance of natural resources but also because of its recurring territorial and jurisdictional infractions. There are numerous players who participate in securing this region in the real world of actual implementation on the ground. These are the Indonesian Navy, the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), the Directorate of Water and Air Police (Polairud), the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), the North Kalimantan Regional Government, and other agencies interested. They both play a strategic role and part in protecting the maritime sovereignty of Indonesia. Nonetheless, this institutional diversity is usually problematic, especially when it comes to cross-organizational communication. Some of the key variables that determine the success of the policy implementation include the communication between policy implementers. Communication is viewed not only as a process of conveying information, but also as a process of building shared understanding, establishing strategic consensus, and avoiding differing interpretations of policy mandates.

Interviews with key informants revealed that communication between organizations implementing maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border region still faces significant challenges, both structurally and technically. Despite the existence of coordination forums, such as cross agency meetings with Bakamla (Law and Security Agency), as well as the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL), the Water Police (Polairud), and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), these systems have not been applied in a systematic and sustainable manner. Communication is often formal and administrative, rather than operational and responsive. The persistence of sectoral egos and differences in operational procedures between agencies are key factors in the weak flow of efficient communication. This has led to delay in reaction to sea cases like boundary intrusion or unlawful action in the Ambalat waters. This absence of a combined system of communication or cross-agency command center leads to uneven distribution of information among the work units and inaccuracy of the

information. This is likely to cause duplication of handling cases or even negligence to act since there is an assumption that another agency has acted. Three areas have improved in an effort to enhance tactical communication using an integrated maritime surveillance system (Maritime Surveillance Integrated System) and joint exercises. However, these initiatives are still in their infancy and require regulatory support and cross-sectoral commitment for their effective implementation.

Based on the sources mentioned above, the researcher concludes that the successful implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border is significantly influenced by effective inter-organizational communication. The complex and dynamic issues of maritime security require urgent need to be solved through responsive, integrated as well as information technology-based communication. The lack of advancement in this area will keep the implementation of the policy as a challenge in terms of coordination that will go against the realization of national strategic objectives in the Ambalat region. According to numerous studies as well as field reports, there are still serious difficulties in communication between the maritime security policy-implementing agencies in the Ambalat. One is technical limitations, including the absence of an integrated system of real-time communication among agencies. Operational information is still delivered manually or through lengthy bureaucratic channels, often delaying responses to threats.

Second, in terms of organizational structure, each agency has its own command and operational procedures that are not always synchronized. This creates the potential for overlap and lack of coordination during emergencies in the field. Third, psychological and cultural factors within the organization also pose obstacles. Sectoral egos, role dominance, and a lack of trust between agencies contribute to ineffective communication. For example, maritime intelligence obtained by one agency is not immediately shared with other agencies due to confidentiality or limited authority.

Fourth, the lack of a unified standard operating procedure (SOP) across agencies for handling maritime security cases, such as smuggling, maritime boundary violations, and illegal fishing, forces each agency to act based on its own protocol. This results in coordination being limited to ceremonial meetings without joint operational follow-up. The effectiveness of communication can be measured by four factors: main indicators:

- 1) Clarity of the information communicated,
- 2) Compliance of communication channels with organizational structure,
- 3) Continuous uninterrupted communication, and
- 4) Openness and participation among policy actors.

These four indicators have not been fully met. The Indonesian Navy's patrol command may not always be aware of Polairud's operational plans, while the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) conducts surveillance without direct synergy with Bakamla, despite being located in the same location. Therefore, a transformation of the inter-organizational communication system is necessary, both in terms of policy and technology. First, there must be a cross-sectoral policy requiring rapid and transparent information exchange in vulnerable areas like Ambalat. Second, an integrated maritime coordination center based on information technology needs to be established, which can access data and movements from all agencies on a single platform. Third, communication channels must be upgraded from formal administrative to more flexible and responsive, for example through secure digital communication channels, digital VHF radio, and satellite-based early warning systems.

Improving human resource capacity through joint exercises, joint simulations, and the formation of joint task forces will significantly reduce communication barriers. Integrated patrol procedures and a rapid cross-agency reporting system need to be implemented immediately to respond to the evolving real threats in Ambalat. Therefore, inter-organizational communication is not a secondary issue in maritime security policy, but rather the heart of successful implementation in the field. Without strong, synchronous, and open communication, all designed policy instruments will fail to function as expected. In the context of Ambalat, improving communication is a strategic path to ensuring that national sovereignty is not merely safeguarded on paper, but truly upheld at the outermost boundaries of Indonesia's maritime territory.

e. The Implementation of the Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Maritime Border Area

The attitude of implementers is a key element in policy implementation theory. In the framework developed by Meter and Van Horn (1975), the attitude of implementers, or disposition of implementers, refers to the extent to which implementers understand, accept, and commit to the policies for which they are responsible. This stance shows the perceptions, motivations, beliefs, and reactions of the implementers on the contents of the policy and the parties that promulgate the policy. In relation to the maritime security policy of the Ambalat border region, the policy of implementers is critical in effective implementation since the region is a strategic area prone to a variety of threats such as a territorial incursion of foreign ships, unlicensed fishing, smuggling, and boundary clashes with adjacent nations. Therefore, the successful implementation of maritime security policies is largely determined by the mental, ideological, and professional readiness of implementers.

In the Ambalat maritime border region, policy implementation is carried out by a number of institutional actors, including: 1) the Indonesian Navy as the primary guardian of maritime sovereignty; 2) Bakamla as the coordinating agency for maritime security and safety; 3) Polairud for policing functions in territorial waters; 4) the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) in the context of marine resource monitoring. From the day of interviews, it was obtained that the level of implementation of formal policies such as Law No. 43 of 2008 and Presidential Regulation No. 178 of 2014 varies widely. Some implementation understands the urgency of protecting maritime areas as part of maintaining national sovereignty. However, others feel that the policies implemented in the field are still abstract, lack technical skills, and lack applicable operational instructions. This causes implementation to be less proactive or even tend to be reactive to emergency situations.

Most officers demonstrate loyalty and nationalism in carrying out their duties, particularly in the context of maintaining sovereignty in conflict-prone areas. They are aware that border work is not a daily routine task but a national defense. This loyalty however tends to come into conflict with the nature of scarcity of resources on the ground. In many cases, law enforcement officers are required to work without proper logistics or intelligence intelligence. Limited conditions such as a lack of patrol boats, a weak coastal radar system, and the absence of observation posts remain major obstacles. Implementers feel they are being "given a huge responsibility without adequate means of war."

Implementers' attitudes to these conditions vary some continue to carry out their duties with full dedication, while others are beginning to show signs of irresponsibility. apathetic because they feel their sacrifices are not matched by support from the central government. Inter-agency relationships also determine the attitude of implementers. According to most of the implementers, there were a lot of coordination between Bakamla, the Indonesian Navy, the Water Police, and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in a sectoral as opposed to an integrated fashion. Discord in the process of role and data sharing causes misunderstanding in command, which will eventually affect the effectiveness of activities in the field. This results in implementers becoming less responsive or choosing to "wait for instructions" instead of taking strategic initiatives.

The attitudes of implementers, whether supportive or passive, have direct implications for the effectiveness of policy implementation. Policies get translated into action in a relatively easy way when the implementing people are highly motivated, they understand the context and are in a positive attitude, even when under limited conditions. But when implementers are apathetic, do not believe in the effectiveness of the policy or they are not part of the policy formulation process, the implementation will be more likely to fail or stagnate. Therefore, it is important for the central government and policymakers to: Improve the training and capacity of implementing human resources; Provide space for implementers to participate in policy evaluation and improvement; Improve the quality of communication between policymakers and implementers; Provide adequate incentives and logistical support to maintain implementer motivation.

The attitude of implementers reflects their trust, readiness, and commitment to their national duties. In the context of maritime security at the Ambalat border, where geopolitical sensitivity is high, the attitude of implementers must be a primary focus in policy implementation strategies. Through a participatory approach, capacity building, and strong inter-agency coordination, a positive attitude of implementers can be a key driver of success in safeguarding Indonesia's maritime sovereignty.

f. Economic, Social and Political Environment in the Implementation of Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Maritime Border Area

The Ambalat maritime border region, located in the Sulawesi Sea near North Kalimantan, holds high strategic value for Indonesia's national sovereignty due to its wealth of natural resources, such as oil and gas, and its location at the center of a territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. In implementing maritime security policies in this region, the economic, social, and political environments are crucial interrelated factors that must be analyzed holistically. Economically, border communities, such as those on Sebatik Island, remain heavily dependent on the informal sector, particularly fisheries and cross-border trade, which often triggers illegal activities such as the smuggling of goods, fuel, and seafood. These practices arise from pressing economic needs, so a harsh security approach without considering the local economy risks creating social conflict and worsening community well-being. Legal uncertainty resulting from the unresolved Ambalat dispute also has the potential to reduce investment, particularly in the oil and gas exploration sector. Socially, the cultural closeness of the border communities to communities in Sabah, Malaysia, means that the administrative border is not fully recognized in social reality.

Kinship ties, shared language, and cultural ties make boundary violations by local residents considered commonplace, rather than a violation of state law. This, consequently, minimizes the efficiency of the implementation of the maritime security policy and the involvement of the population in the protection of the territorial sovereignty. In the political aspect, on the other hand, besides being a legal-formal problem, the Ambalat Block dispute is also a source of diplomatic tension between Indonesia and Malaysia. Even though Indonesia is *de facto* in control of the area, the regular appearance of Malaysian patrol vessels has increased the tensions and the maritime security forces have to meet high levels of preparedness.

The Indonesian government has tried to put together diplomacy and energy strategies like the recent joint exploration agreement that was signed between Pertamina and Petronas meant to alleviate conflict and establish regional stability. Nevertheless, a weak coordination of inter-agencies, overlapping regulations and non-synchronization of central policy and regional policy continue to be barriers to the implementation of maritime security policies, consequently lowering the efficiency of central and regional policy supervision and enforcement of the law in the Ambalat maritime border area. Therefore, an effective maritime security approach must consider the economic conditions of the community, socio-cultural sensitivities, and bilateral political dynamics in a comprehensive and integrated manner.

Socially, the close cultural and kinship ties between Indonesians in Sebatik and communities in Sabah, Malaysia, mean that the administrative boundaries are not clearly understood by the community. Therefore, in most times, boundary violations are conducted within the context of what the local community views as normal in the social relations, yet is a challenge to the authorities in ensuring territorial sovereignty. Politically, the border of the territorial issue between Indonesia and Malaysia in Ambalat has been a sensitive move, especially when both nations send their patrol boats at the same time. This necessitates the security forces to be professional and take into consideration a policy of maintaining a balance of both enhancing defence and diplomatic approach. Furthermore, policy implementation also faces challenges in inter-agency coordination due to overlapping authorities and differences in standard operating procedures (SOPs) in carrying out patrols or monitoring the region.

In general, the speakers emphasized the importance of a maritime security approach that is not solely militaristic but must be grounded in a comprehensive understanding of the region's economic, socio-cultural, and political realities. Besides improving the surveillance capability, community economic empowerment strategy and policy combination among the institutions are also required as the main basis of bolstering maritime security implementation within the Ambalat maritime border region. The three environments (economic, social and political) are interrelated and create a challenge in enforcing the maritime security policies. Too militaristic without considering social and economic factors can be rather counterproductive. Best policies have to be multidimensional that combine law enforcement with local economic development and bilateral diplomatic dialogue. Increasing community participation, such as reporting maritime violations by coastal communities, synergy of coordination between agencies (TNI AL, Bakamla, KKP, Polairud), and

synchronization of central and regional policies are important strategies to maintain sovereignty without violating the rights of local communities.

g. What Factors Support and Hinder the Implementation of the Maritime Security Policy in the Ambalat Maritime Border Area?

The Ambalat maritime border region is one of Indonesia's strategic areas, directly bordering Malaysia. It is located in the Sulawesi Sea, adjacent to Sebatik Island in North Kalimantan. Ambalat holds significant geopolitical and geostrategic significance, as it serves as an international shipping lane and is rich in natural resources, particularly oil and gas. Therefore, the existence and implementation of maritime security policies in this region are crucial to Indonesia's national interests, both in terms of sovereignty, defense, and development.

The implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border region is influenced by several factors that both support and hinder its success. On the supporting side, there is a strong commitment from the government, manifested through formal regulations such as Law Number 43 of 2008 concerning State Territory, Law Number 32 of 2014 concerning Maritime Affairs, and Presidential Regulation Number 178 of 2014 concerning the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), which serve as the legal basis for implementing maritime security duties. Also, the existence of law enforcement agencies like the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, and Polairud that effectively carry out patrols and activities like the RI-Malaysia Ambalat Border Security Operation shows that the country is willing to protect the maritime sovereignty. The early detection system in the field is also enhanced by the support of local communities especially in Sebatik Island which have a very high nationalism and are involved in reporting illegal activities. At the international level, the collaboration between Indonesia and ASEAN countries such as Malaysia in form of joint patrols and exchange of intelligence information known as the Malacca Strait Patrol, the Information Fusion Center also plays a significant role in making maritime border surveillance effective.

However, the implementation of this policy also faces significant obstacles, such as overlapping authority between maritime law enforcement agencies Bakamla, the Indonesian Navy, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), and the Water Police (Polair), which often leads to weak coordination and operational inefficiencies. Limited human resource and logistical infrastructure including the availability of the patrol vessels and available maritime surveillance facilities are also significant setbacks, particularly due to the common extreme weather pattern in the Sulawesi Sea. Additionally, the socio-economic conditions of the border society, which largely relies on cross-border interactions, such as archaic trade and fishing, are distinctly problematic, since most of them commit unlawful crimes under the pressure of the economy. The political relations and the unsolved international conflict between the Ambalat and Malaysia imply that the policies should be adopted with care so as not to create any international diplomatic conflicts. Lastly, there has been the absence of awareness and education of the people concerning maritime boundaries and the role of security forces and thus there is low participation by the people in facilitating the implementation of the policy. Therefore, the successful implementation of maritime security policies in Ambalat requires comprehensive improvements, including regulations, institutional coordination, increased logistical capacity, and sustainable community empowerment.

In implementing maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border region, several factors significantly influence their effectiveness, both supporting and hindering. Facilitating factors will include the provision of a clear legal framework, including Law No. 32 of 2014 on Maritime Affairs and Law No. 43 of 2008 on State Territory that offer a legal framework regarding the protection of the Indonesian maritime sovereignty. Moreover, the fact that implementing institutions like the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, and Polairud are present in these waters engaging in patrol, including in the RI-Malaysia Ambalat Border Security Operation, enhances security in such waters. Cooperation with the international institutions, including coordinated patrols with Malaysia is also supported, which also helps in the surveillance of the region. The involvement of the local communities, especially in Sebatik Island, is also crucial as they are very sensitive to the need to keep sovereignty and often share information about illegal practices. Nevertheless, there still exist a number of challenges that have to be overcome, such as the duplication of authority among maritime law enforcement services, resulting in ineffective coordination; resource scarcity, i.e. personnel, patrol fleets and surveillance

devices are limited; and very severe geographical and weather conditions that make the work in the field difficult.

Furthermore, challenges also arise from the socio-economic aspects of border communities who depend on cross-border activities for their livelihoods, thus risking unintentional violations of territorial boundaries. This is compounded by the lack of socialization and education regarding applicable legal regulations and maritime boundaries. Therefore, the successful implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat region depends heavily on integrated and sustained efforts between government agencies, law enforcement officers, and the community, as well as the need for institutional reform and strengthening operational capacity in the field. Overall, the nurturing and dissuading influences to the application of the policy of Maritime Security in the Ambalat Maritime Border Region show that the successful execution of the maritime security policies in the Ambalat region requires a focus on the consistent cross-sectoral coordination, reinforcement of the institutional capacity and on the holistic and sustainable approach to the issue that would focus not only on the military or legal factor but would refer to the social and economic facets of the communities living within the boundaries. However, several obstacles remain, including overlapping authority between maritime law enforcement agencies, leading to inefficient coordination; limited resources such as personnel, patrol fleets, and surveillance technology; and extreme geographic and weather conditions that complicate field operations.

IV. CONCLUSION

The implementation of maritime security policies in the Ambalat maritime border region faces various complex challenges encompassing structural, functional, and cultural aspects. Legally, Indonesia's claim to the Ambalat Block is firmly grounded in the 1969 Continental Shelf Treaty and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), although not recognized by Malaysia, which bases its claim on a unilateral 1979 map. However, policy implementation on the ground remains suboptimal. First, in terms of policy dimensions and objectives, the formulation of maritime security objectives remains general and non-specific, and lacks measurable indicators at the operational level, complicating performance evaluation.

Second, in terms of resources, limitations in personnel, logistics, budget, and surveillance technology pose significant obstacles to safeguarding this vast and conflict-prone region. Third, the characteristics of organizations that carry out security functions are still overshadowed by sectoral egos between institutions such as the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, Polairud, and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), which are not balanced by the existence of a unified command or lead agency that has full authority, so that there is often overlapping authority and confusion in decision-making. Fourth, communication between organizations is still formal and administrative, not operational and responsive, which causes delays in sharing important information, both operational and intelligence, due to the absence of a real-time integrated communication system between these institutions.

Suggestion

- a) Strengthening Regulations and Institutions: Proposing the establishment of a legal umbrella that establishes one institution as the lead agency or integrated command, and recommending the revision or harmonization of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) between agencies (TNI AL, Bakamla, Polairud, KKP) to create a synergistic and integrated workflow.
- b) Developing Communication and Coordination: Establishing a joint command center that can serve as a platform for real-time communication and rapid and transparent distribution of intelligence information between agencies. Conducting regular, programmed joint exercises involving all relevant agencies to strengthen tactical communication and build a collaborative work culture.

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